Then and Now: What Have We Learned from Chicago’s Past Attempts at Police Reform?
Published: November 3, 2020
By Elijah Gelman, Chicago Appleseed Intern
For the third time in 14 years, Chicago is looking to overhaul its police oversight system. Two ordinances have been proposed: the Civilian Police Accountability Council (CPAC) and the Grassroots Alliance for Police Accountability (GAPA). While both create an office to oversee policy of the Chicago Police Department (CPD) and Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA), they differ in important ways.
Of the two proposals, GAPA is more moderate and relies mainly on incremental change. GAPA cedes most of the power to the Mayor, who both selects nominated candidates to serve as GAPA representatives and gets final say in the hiring of a Police Superintendent and the Chief Administrator of COPA. The ordinance gives GAPA some power to determine the policy of both the CPD and COPA, but allows the CPD and COPA to keep power in policymaking by emphasizing the need “to try to reach consensus about proposed policies.” Finally, while GAPA is able to “review any aspect of the operation of COPA,” it limits itself by committing to “not review, seek information about or in any way interfere with ongoing COPA investigations” (20).
CPAC, on the other hand, focuses on progressive change. CPAC’s members are publicly elected by communities, and they have the power to appoint a Police Superintendent and Chief Administrator of COPA. CPAC also takes sole power in deciding CPD “rules and regulations.” Lastly, CPAC takes immense control over COPA, as its responsibility to “[supervise] the Chief Administrator of COPA” goes beyond “annual evaluations” and allows CPAC to have an active role in COPA investigations by “directing that the Chief Administrator Investigator conduct investigations into police misconduct.”
A look back at past attempts to implement a police oversight system in Chicago will shed light on which approach, GAPA or CPAC, would be more effective.
1974 – 2007: Office of Professional Standards (OPS)
Chicago’s first attempt at an independent police oversight department was the Office of Professional Standards (OPS) in 1974. Before the OPS, the CPD had internally investigated police misconduct, but a blue ribbon panel found that “complaints from citizens of abusive conduct by police are almost universally rejected by the Police Department’s self-investigation system” and recommended the “creation of an independent investigating agency.”
Despite claiming to be independent, the OPS had many direct ties to the CPD. The OPS itself was considered a part of the CPD, and its Chief Administrator was appointed by the Mayor and worked under the Police Superintendent. These connections inevitably led the OPS to be biased in favor of the police they were supposed to be investigating. OPS staff were considered to “conduct sloppy investigations” and “place…enormous burden on complainants to prove their cases.” It was widely accepted that the OPS was “vulnerable to pressure by the police union,” leading one attorney to comment: “If the police officer denies it, you’re out of luck.”[1]
The OPS’s issues can best be illustrated by their investigation into Police Commander Jon Burge in 1990. Throughout his 20 year tenure as Police Commander, Jon Burge and the police under him committed at least 118 documented acts of torture on “mostly black suspects.” OPS investigators concluded “that abuse did occur,” “that it was systematic,” that “the time span involved covers more than ten years,” and that “the type of abuse described…went into such esoteric areas as psychological techniques and planned torture.”
The police union sought to stifle any attempts to punish Burge and the officers associated with him. First, the police union attempted to block the release of internal CPD documents relating to the investigation by arguing it was necessary “to protect the privacy interests of officers named in the files” and that it would “negatively affect future police internal investigations.” When that failed and Burge was dismissed, the police union attempted to get him reinstated. When this attempt was struck down by a judge, police union president William Nolan argued it was “strictly a political victory” and “a miscarriage of justice.”[2] While they could not get Burge reinstated, the police union was largely successful in pressuring the OPS. Only three officers, Burge included, were disciplined even though there were numerous officers linked to “the other sixty-four cases where torture was alleged.” This lack of discipline occurred despite “OPS investigators reopen[ing] twelve of the torture cases” and recommending “discipline for several officers,” as the OPS Chief Administrator “overruled the recommendations.”
OPS’s issues with bias for police came to a head in 2006, when special prosecutors released a grueling 292 page report detailing the full extent of the torture conducted by the CPD under Police Commander Jon Burge. This report was followed only a year later by a study, led by law professor Craig Futterman, which found that “the odds…that a Chicago police officer will receive any meaningful discipline as a result of being charged with abusing a civilian” are “two in 1000.”[3]
2007 – 2017: Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA)
The blowback OPS received was immense, leading to OPS being dissolved and the Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA) being established in 2007. Other than the name change, it is difficult to see how the IPRA differed from the OPS. IPRA’s Chief Administrator was still appointed by the Mayor and it “inherited the exact same staff (from OPS).” Thus, the IPRA continued to rarely recommend disciplinary action against police officers.
IPRA’s failures came to the forefront in 2015 after video was released of the murder of 17 year old Laquan McDonald. On October 20, 2014, Laquan Mcdonald was shot 16 times by Chicago Police Officer Jason Van Dyke. While the IPRA conducted its investigation, police union spokesperson Pat Camden immediately came out to defend the shooting, claiming the teenager “lunged at the police” and that “officers were forced to defend themselves.” The City of Chicago—IPRA—refused to publicly release police dashcam footage, but was eventually ordered to do so by a judge. The video showed everything Camden said was false: “McDonald posed no immediate threat to anyone” and had “made no movements toward any officers at the time Van Dyke fired the first shot.” It then came out that “twenty citizen complaints” had been made against Van Dyke before he murdered Laquan McDonald, yet “IPRA never found cause to discipline Van Dyke, and never factored any previous complaint into its investigation of the next one.”
In response, Mayor Rahm Emanuel assembled the Police Accountability Task Force (PATF) to investigate the problems in the CPD that led to the murder of McDonald. The report fully uncovered IPRA’s failures, finding that the IPRA was “under-resourced, lack[ed] true independence” and was “not held accountable for their work.” The IPRA had not investigated “40% of complaints filed,” and its “disciplinary recommendations” were “reduced or eliminated…in 73% of cases.” The task force concluded that “IPRA ha[d] lost the trust of the community, which it cannot function without,” and suggested it be replaced “with a new and fully transparent and accountable Civilian Police Investigative Agency.”
IPRA’s failure to hold police accountable was in part due to its bias for police. In 2015, IPRA investigator Lorenzo Davis was ordered by Chief Administrator Scott M. Ando “to change findings in at least a dozen cases, all shootings or alleged excessive-force incidents.” Chief Administrator Ando wanted Davis to revise “his findings…that the officers had violated laws or police department rules.” When Davis refused, Ando fired him. Davis being fired simply because he refused to change his conclusion on use-of-force incidents illustrates the pro-police bias of IPRA.
IPRA attempted to reform itself in June 2016. In an effort to emphasize transparency, IPRA changed their policies that led to the delay of McDonald’s dashcam video and “released hundreds of videos of police incidents” to the public. This step toward transparency immediately faced opposition from the police union. Then-head of the police union, Dean Angelo, “strongly disagree[d] that these videos will restore confidence and trust,” saying he didn’t “understand the purpose behind it” and claiming the IRPA didn’t “know what they’re doing.”
2017 – Present: Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA)
Attempts at reforming the IPRA proved to be too little to combat the distrust it had earned. In October 2016, the City Council voted to replace the IPRA with the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA), which is Chicago’s current police oversight office. The major ways COPA differs from the IPRA is in its accountability and independence. In an attempt to ensure COPA is accountable, the Office of the Inspector General was given “explicit authority” to “review the entirety of the police oversight system.” COPA is also able to act independently, as it “has explicit access to all information in the possession of the police…in order to do its work regardless of its connection to a specific ongoing investigation.” Yet, COPA “did not create a new function of police oversight” and has “largely the same basic jurisdiction and responsibilities” as IPRA, with COPA’s Chief Administrator still being appointed by the Mayor.
The similarities between COPA and IPRA have caused some concerns about an indirect influence from the police it investigates. For example, the shooting of Ricardo Hayes, a 19 year-old with mental disabilities—whose case is eerily similar to that of Laquan McDonald—was shot by Sgt. Khalil Muhammad on August 13, 2017. Like IPRA’s treatment of McDonald’s case, COPA delayed the release of video of the incident until October 16, 2018, a full 14 months after the shooting took place. This delay was despite a new policy meant to avoid delays like with the McDonald video, which stated that “videos of police shootings are to be released within 60 days of the incident.”
The COPA investigation itself found Sgt. Muhammad acted wrongly, stating Muhammad “did not have probable cause to believe Hayes had comitted any crime, let alone a violent crime”; that he “did not have reason to believe Hayes was armed and dangerous”; and that “an officer with similar training and experience as Sgt. Muhammad would not have reasonably believed that Hayes posed an immediate threat of death or serious bodily harm and/or that the use of deadly force was otherwise justified.” These findings led “several former COPA investigators and supervisors” to believe that there could be no “other outcome but termination” for Sgt. Muhammad. Although COPA investigators found that Muhammad had unjustifiably used force against an unarmed civilian, COPA Chief Administrator Sydney Roberts instead recommended he receive a mere 60-day suspension. Former COPA employees believe the decision to recommend an unwarrantedly small punishment was biased toward police.
Unfortunately, it seems that COPA’s failures are not just isolated to the Hayes case. Just this September, the Inspector General released two reports detailing COPA’s failure to abide by its own stated policies. First, COPA was found to have ignored its own guidelines in determining when to close an investigation via “Administrative Termination,” leading to numerous investigations into police misconduct being incorrectly closed. The report notes COPA incorrectly used Administrative Termination when it did not apply, failed to meet all required criteria for Administrative Termination when it did apply, and never gained approval for the use of Administrative Termination by the Chief Administrator when it was supposed to. Second, COPA was found to have failed to abide by their policy of always releasing “all relevant materials for use-of-force incidents…within 60 days of the incident.” The Inspector General reports that out of the “122 use-of-force incidents” analyzed, “thirty-three, or 27%, did not have any information posted…within 60 days of the incident.”
The City of Chicago is doing COPA no favors, as they continue to resist police reform. Just this October, the CPD was given recommendations by a Use of Force Community Working Group that had been initiated by the Mayor and Police Superintendent as an important step to improve CPD use-of-force policy. There were hopes for real change, as Mayor Lori E. Lightfoot stated that the “20 diverse community members” who made up the Community Working Group would “not only review and revise all nine of CPD’s Use of Force policies but also work in partnership to build a better, safer and stronger [Chicago Police] Department.” Ultimately, out of the 155 recommendations provided, the CPD accepted just 5, all of which “are largely technical in nature.”
What Hasn’t Changed
From OPS to IPRA to COPA, two things have remained the same:
First, the supposed “independent” police oversight entities in Chicago show consistent bias toward the police they were meant to investigate. This bias—consciously or not—tends to come from the Mayor-appointed Chief Administrator. With the OPS, the Chief Administrator overruled the disciplinary recommendations of its investigators who attempted to discipline those associated with Superintendent Jon Burge’s torturous police regime. The last IPRA Chief Administrator fired an investigator who concluded that police acted wrongly in use-of-force incidents. And COPA has historically provided lenient disciplinary sentences to police officers who COPA investigators concluded acted egregiously.
Second, the police have consistently attempted to resist necessary reform. When the OPS attempted to rid the CPD of Police Commander Burge and the police officers who committed numerous acts of torture, the police union attempted to stifle the investigation by blocking access to files, tried to get Burge reinstated after his dismissal, and called the whole process “a miscarriage of justice” when they failed to do so. When the IPRA was investigating the shooting of Laquan McDonald, the police union spread blatant misinformation about what occurred and argued reform to increase transparency was ineffective and counterproductive.[4] And when a Community Working Group was created with the blessing of both the Mayor and Police Superintendent to reform CPD use-of-force policies, the CPD accepted a mere 5 recommendations—3.2%—out of the 155, none of which were substantial.
These two issues have stifled every attempt at police reform in Chicago for the last half-century. Chicago will never move past its history of racist police brutality as long as it has a department unwilling to make improvements and a police oversight system unwilling to force them to.
So, CPAC or GAPA?
With the history presented and the continuing issues drawn out, Chicago must now decide between two choices of how to proceed: GAPA or CPAC.
Simply put, it is unlikely GAPA will create any substantive change. GAPA does not adequately address the issues of police bias in the oversight system and police unwillingness to reform that have plagued past police oversight attempts, because it reflects many of the same failed approaches we have seen time-and-again. GAPA still allows the Mayor to have the final say in choosing the Chief Administrator of COPA and the CPD Superintendent. While GAPA is able to choose the list of nominees the Mayor can pick from, nothing stops the Mayor from continually rejecting these nominees until GAPA picks one that the Mayor approves.. GAPA’s policymaking power is equally fraught with issues. The emphasis it puts on “reach[ing] consensus about proposed policies” when it comes to CPD policy will likely lead GAPA to create only minor technical changes, as the CPD has proven those are the only policy changes it is willing to accept.
CPAC, on the other hand, attempts to finally tackle the issues that have marred past police oversight systems head on—and thus can promote real reform in the CPD. Having a publicly elected council appoint the Chief Administrator of COPA, rather than the Mayor, would create an unprecedented opportunity for community-informed transparency and oversight. In taking full control of CPD “rules and regulations,” CPAC can force a CPD that has been dead-set against reform to actually change its use-of-force policies for the better.
Chicago has a choice. It can adopt GAPA—an oversight system that appears to differ in name only from prior efforts that have required overhaul every decade—or it can adopt CPAC and finally instill a police oversight system that will effectively curb racist and violent police practices and address CPD’s unwillingness to reform.
Check our blog throughout November as we continue our series on accountability in the Chicago Police Department. For more resources, visit www.ChicagoAppleseed.org/Community-Resources/#Chicago-Police.
Referenced:
[1] Attorney Standish Willis, qtd. In “Chicago: Office of Professional Standards.” Shielded from Justice: Police Brutality and Accountability in the United States, Human Rights Watch, June 1998, (1).
[2] Fegelman, Andrew. “Cop Firing in Torture Case Upheld.” Chicago Tribune, 11 Feb. 1994.
[3] Futterman, Craig B., et al. “Use of Statistical Evidence to Address Police Supervisory and Disciplinary Practices: The Chicago Police Department’s Broken System.” DePaul Journal For Social Justice, vol. 1, pp. 251–292 (265).
[4] Ford, Quinn. “Cops: Boy, 17, Fatally Shot by Officer after Refusing to Drop Knife.”; Arruza, Eddie, and Meredith Francis. “Chicago Police Union Reacts to IPRA Release of Videos, Audio.”